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Abstract:
We implemented two survey-experiments to test the impact of conspiracy rhetoric on the views
of US residents about the consequences of climate change and support for direct carbon capture.
The first study focused on how receptive respondents were to a scientific report on the impacts of
climate change when they were also presented with conspiracy-based criticism of the report’s
conclusions. The second study explored how conspiracy rhetoric criticizing a report
recommending the consideration of direct carbon capture influences support for the technology.
We assess the effects of exposure to the conspiracy claims both in isolation and in contexts
where scientific evidence contradicts the conspiratorial attack. We include a partisan source cue
to test whether its presence enhances the impact of the messages on in-group partisans. The
results accentuate the conditional nature of conspiracy rhetoric on views about the consequences
of climate change and support for a novel climate geoengineering technology.
Keywords: public opinion, climate change, conspiracy rhetoric, science

2

Conspiracy theories surrounding science have proliferated in recent years. A conspiracy
is a “plan carried out in secret by small groups of powerful people that do harm to the public
good” (Uscinski et al., 2017; also see, Douglas et al., 2019 Sunstein & Vermeule 2009, p. 205).
Conspiracy theories, on the other hand, are “unsubstantiated explanations of events or
circumstances that accuse powerful malevolent groups of plotting in secret for their own benefit
against the common good” (Uscinski et al., 2017). These narratives often entail claims that
governments, large corporations, and/or scientists are deceiving the public for selfish and
nefarious purposes (Goertzel, 2010). People who espouse conspiracy theories sometimes claim
simply to be critical thinkers or skeptics asking rational questions (van Prooijen, 2019). Simple
skepticism, however, differs from belief in conspiracy in that the latter tends “to focus on the
alleged wrongdoings of institutions, elites, and authorities, which include science and scientists”
(Rutjens et al., 2021, p. 79). Conspiracy theories are often attractive explanations because they
help people interpret confusing or otherwise ambiguous events and may give people more of a
feeling of control in an uncertain situation (Haltinner & Sarathchandra, 2017; Oliver & Wood,
2014; Uscinski et al., 2017; Uscinski & Olivella, 2017).
When it comes to climate change, the most prevalent conspiracy theory is that it is a
“hoax”, or malicious deception, perpetuated largely by scientists for financial or ideological
reasons (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, and Gignac, 2013, p.630). Other climate conspiracy theories
affirm the existence of global warming but accuse carbon-emitting industries of, at the very least,
stalling polices that might help remedy its impacts in order to ensure continued profits
(Hofmeister, 2010; MacKay & Munro, 2012), and even violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act through the propagation of misinformation (Baxendale,
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2018). A person believing in a specific conspiracy theory is said to possess a “conspiracy
belief.” This belief is not necessarily false given that some conspiracy theories ultimately are
proven to be real events (Douglas et al., 2019). Conspiracy rhetoric refers to “public discourse,
spoken, written, or otherwise expressed which seeks to discuss or spread conspiracy theories”
(Uscinski et al., 2017). We define a conspiracy theory effect as having occurred when exposure
to conspiracy rhetoric increases the prevalence of a conspiracy belief (e.g., Einstein & Glick,
2015; Uscinski et al., 2016; van der Linden, 2015). While it is often assumed that the rapid
dissemination of conspiracy theories about climate change (and other scientific issues) present a
grave threat to humans and societies, relatively few studies have examined this in settings where
general information about the underlying science is more or less familiar, as well as in
competitive and politicized information environments.
This paper seeks to fill gaps in the existing literature by: (1) investigating two climatechange-related conspiracy theories to evaluate the existence and robustness of the conspiracy
theory effect; (2) assessing the degree to which scientific consensus information can combat this
effect; and (3) evaluating the impact of attribution of conspiracy rhetoric to partisan sources to
determine if this affects people’s receptivity to the information. We implemented two large
survey-experiments: one that measured U.S. residents’ views about the impacts of climate
change and a second measuring support for a relatively novel and unfamiliar geoengineering
technology. The first study focused on the influence of conspiracy rhetoric attacking a scientific
report describing the negative effects that will occur in the U.S. due to climate change. The
second study focused on how conspiracy rhetoric surrounding a scientific report that emphasized
the benefits of direct carbon capture influences support for the technology. We find that the
effects of scientific consensus information and conspiracy rhetoric are conditional on the specific
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contexts in which they are communicated. These findings have significant implications for
researchers and practitioners.
What do we know about conspiracy rhetoric and climate change beliefs?
Exposure to conspiracy rhetoric associated with climate change has been shown to
weaken belief in climate change and willingness to engage in pro-social environmental actions.
In one study, van der Linden (2015) investigated the conspiracy effect by exposing survey
respondents to a 2-minute video that either promoted the idea that climate change was a hoax
(clip from a popular conspiracy movie, “The Great Global Warming Swindle”), or emphasized
the importance of taking action on climate change (UN 2009 video clip, “Raise Your Voice
About Climate Change”). Relative to a control group that did not see either video, respondents
who were exposed to the conspiracy rhetoric were more likely to believe that “global warming is
a hoax”, less likely to personally sign an online petition to “stop global warming”, and less likely
to donate or volunteer their time with a charitable organization. In another study, Jolley and
Douglas (2014a) asked people to read a paragraph about climate change that either supported or
refuted a conspiracy claim that climate scientists are manipulating data about the amount of
global warming that has occurred. They found that exposure to the conspiracy theory reduced
people’s intentions to lower their carbon footprint by purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs or
to use more carbon-friendly modes of transportation.
Based on the studies that have demonstrated a conspiracy theory effect following
exposure to climate conspiracy theories, we offer the following prediction:
Exposure to conspiracy rhetoric will: (a) reduce perceptions about the negative effects
and fundamental risks of climate change and increase beliefs that climate change is a
hoax (study 1); and (b) reduce support for direct carbon capture and increase beliefs that
carbon capture is a deception (study 2). (Hypothesis 1a and 1b).
What do we know about response to the science of climate change?
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Exposure to credible scientific information has been found to have a powerful impact on
people’s beliefs about climate change. The Gateway-Belief-Model (GBM) (Lewandowsky et al.,
2013; van der Linden et al., 2015) theorizes that presenting individuals with a message that “97%
of climate scientists believe in human-caused climate change” will increase people’s accuracy in
their estimate of the level of scientific agreement, and that this shift in perception of the expert
consensus will have “cascading changes in other key beliefs about the issue, such as the belief
that climate change is happening, human-caused, and a worrisome risk that requires international
coordination” (van der Linden et al., 2019, p. 50; van der Linden, 2021). The GBM describes a
process of attitude formation and change in which the public’s perception of the certainty of a
scientific consensus indirectly influences beliefs about the degree to which is it human-caused
and support for policy action. Many empirical studies have investigated and found support for
the GBM’s core theoretical mechanisms (e.g., Cook et al., 2017; Goldberg et al., 2020;
Lewandowsky et al., 2013; van der Linden et al., 2015); however, the impact of scientific
consensus information on climate change can be reduced when it is contested with politicization
or other forms of scientific misinformation (Bayes, Druckman, et al., 2020; Bolsen & Druckman,
2018a; van der Linden et al., 2017).
A growing number of studies have investigated the bases of public support for carbon
capture and storage technologies (Arning et al., 2020; Brunsting et al., 2011; Kahan et al., 2015;
Kahlor et al., 2020; Klaus et al., 2021; Moon et al., 2020; Sun et al., 2020). Carbon capture and
storage (CCS) is a process that involves separating carbon dioxide from the exhaust or waste at
sources, such as power plants or factories, and transporting it and storing it underground
(Gibbins & Chalmers, 2008). A consistent finding from surveys that measure the public’s
perceptions about CCS is that there are generally low levels of awareness about this emergent
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technology (Raimi, 2021; Bellamy et al., 2019; Carlisle et al., 2020). Several studies have also
examined how exposing individuals to different types of information about CCS can influence
public opinion (Broecks et al., 2016; Corner & Pidgeon, 2015; Klaus et al., 2021; Pianta et al.,
2021; Jones et al., 2017; Raimi et al., 2019; Tcvetkov et al., 2019; Whitmarsh et al., 2019).
Based on research demonstrating the general impact of scientific information on the
beliefs and attitudes of individuals related to climate change, we offer the following prediction:
Exposure to scientific information from a consensus report about the effects of climate
change or the benefits of direct carbon capture will: (a) increase perceptions about the
negative effects and fundamental risks of climate change (study 1); and, (b) increase
support for direct carbon capture (study 2). (Hypothesis 2a and 2b).
What do we know about competitive framing and climate change beliefs?
A frame refers to words, phrases, or images that make salient a particular aspect of any
attitude-object, such as a candidate, policy, or issue (Druckman, 2001). Numerous studies
demonstrate that exposure to framed messages emphasizing different aspects of climate change,
such as its national security, economic or environmental implications, can increase people’s
concern for addressing the problem (for a review, see Bolsen & Shapiro, 2018; Nisbet, 2009). To
our knowledge, however, no published studies to date have explored how presenting individuals
with conspiracy rhetoric in competition with conclusions from a consensus scientific report
shapes climate change beliefs.
Several studies have tested the impact of communicating scientific consensus messages
about climate change in contexts where “competing frames” are present, such as messages that
politicize the scientific consensus on climate change (Bolsen & Druckman, 2018a; Bolsen et al.,
2019a). Framing theory posits that when individuals are exposed to competing messages of
equal strength, the independent effects of each frame will cancel out and lead to no opinion
change (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Based on this literature, we offer the following prediction:
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Exposure to conspiracy rhetoric and scientific information refuting the conspiracy will
eliminate the “conspiracy theory effect” and result in no belief change. (Hypothesis 3).
What do we know about partisan source cues and climate change beliefs?
In the U.S., climate change is an issue defined by extreme levels of partisan polarization
(Egan & Mullin, 2017). One explanation for this polarization is the role that motivated
reasoning can play when people evaluate new information and form beliefs (Bolsen & Palm,
2019; Taber & Lodge, 2006). For example, Republicans who doubt anthropogenic climate
change may reject scientific messages about climate change as a way to conform their beliefs
with an in-group, protect an existing oppositional view or as a result evaluating any new
scientific information as “less credible” than alternative sources of “truth” – even in the presence
of “accuracy-driven” motivated reasoning (Bayes & Druckman, 2021; Bayes, Bolsen, &
Druckman, 2020; Druckman & McGrath, 2019).
Several studies that have explored how the presence of partisan sources linked with
messages about climate change affect their impact (Benegal & Scruggs, 2018; Bolsen et al.,
2019b; Tesler, 2018). In one study, Republicans were more likely to support a state ballot
proposal on climate change when it was endorsed by in-group party elites (Ehret et al., 2018). In
another study, Republicans were more likely to reject misinformation about climate change and
express beliefs consistent with the fundamental science on climate change when the message
they received was supported by a Republican Senator (Bengal & Scruggs, 2018). Based on the
research showing in-group/out-group partisan source effects when linked with different messages
about climate change, we test the following prediction:
The presence of an in-partisan source cue will enhance the impact of climate conspiracy
rhetoric, and scientific evidence, on partisans’ perceptions about: (a) the negative
effects and fundamental risks of climate change (study 1); and (b) support for direct
carbon capture (study 2). (Hypothesis 4).
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Materials and Methods: Study 1
Study 1 focused on the presence of a conspiracy theory regarding response to the effects
of climate change laid out in the NCA4 report. This report, required by law since 1990 and
released by the Trump administration on November 23, 2018, found that without substantial
mitigation and adaptation efforts the level of damage to the U.S. economy, human health, and the
environment would intensify and that climate change would lead to sea-level rise and more
intense hurricanes and storm surges that will damage coastal communities and force many to
abandon their homes. The NCA4 was released over the Thanksgiving holiday in 2018, and critics
accused the Trump administration of trying to “bury” the report’s conclusions. The President
stated, “I don’t believe it,” when asked about the findings and suggested its conclusions were
based on the most extreme scenarios and “fake science” promoted by a left-wing media as a way
to scare people into supporting a radical “political agenda.” The release of the NCA4 and the
Trump administration’s own remarks on the report’s findings provided an ideal context to assess
the impact of presenting individuals with conspiracy rhetoric – with or without a partisan source
cue – attacking its conclusions.
To evaluate our hypotheses, we implemented a survey experiment in which we randomly
assigned 2,973 participants to one of six experimental conditions that varied the headline and
content in a short news article or to a pure control condition (Table 1). Respondents were
recruited by Qualtrics in August 2019 and included quotas for party identification, gender, age,
and region.1 Respondents randomly assigned to the scientific report condition, were presented
with the headline, “New Federal Climate Assessment Report Released,” followed by details such
as, “The scientific report predicts that climate change will cause hundreds of billions in damages

1

The full sample demographics are reported in the Supplementary Materials.
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by the end of this century. Rising temperatures and extreme heat will cause severe drought and
wildfires throughout the country. This will degrade air quality, decrease crop yields, and reduce
the amount of freshwater available in many places… [T]he report also predicts that climate
change will cause the level of the ocean to rise, flooding many coastal areas in the U.S. Many
people who live in flood-prone locations will have to leave their homes. Storm surges that
happen because of more intense hurricanes will cause salt-water intrusion, contaminating
drinking water and destroying property and ecosystems in the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.”2
[Insert Table 1 here]
Respondents randomly assigned to the conspiracy condition were presented with the
headline, “Global Warming: Fake Science Again Serves Far-Left Political Agenda,” followed by
details calling into question the conclusions from the scientific consensus report, by dismissing it
as ‘fake science’ being promoted by the left-wing media as a way to scare people into supporting
a radical ‘political agenda’… [and that its conclusions] ‘border on the absurd’ and “are supported
by socialist bureaucrats whose goals are to justify sweeping changes in lifestyle and the global
economy.” Another conspiracy condition was a variant of the previous one, but with the
criticism of the report attributed to President Trump (Conspiracy with source cue).
Respondents randomly assigned to the competitive framing condition (Conspiracy and
Scientific Report), were presented with a headline which stated, “Debated Federal Climate
Assessment Report Released,” followed by the consensus information from the NCA4 and then
information from the conspiracy condition, that is the assertion that the report is the result of a
political agenda of “socialist bureaucrats” to “justify sweeping changes in lifestyle and the global
economy.” We varied the presence of a reference to President Trump linked with both the
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The complete wording of the treatments for all conditions is in the Supplementary Materials.
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consensus scientific report and the conspiracy rhetoric – that is the headline in the consensus
information only with a Trump source cue stated, “Trump releases Federal Climate Assessment
Report”, while the conspiracy rhetoric only with a Trump source cue stated, “Trump Argues
Fake Science Again Serves Far-Left Political Agenda” – to test our prediction about in-partisan
sources enhancing the impact of any message (see Table 1).
Participants, except those in the control condition, read a version of the “short article”
and then reported their perception of the extent to which climate change will lead to increased
droughts, wildfires and coastal flooding, intensified hurricanes, limited freshwater availability,
decreased agricultural production, intensified heatwaves, and harm to the U.S. economy.3
Responses to these 8 items formed an index (= .96), which we labeled effects scale and coded
so that higher scores were associated with increasingly negative perceptions about the effects
that climate change would have on the U.S. (7-point composite scale index). We also asked
respondents if they “think that climate change is happening” on a 7-point response scale (1=
definitely not happening; 7=definitely happening), the extent to which they disagreed or agreed
with the statement “climate change is occurring faster now because of human activity” (1=
strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree), and how concerned they were about “the effects that
climate change will have on you, your family, and your community” (1= extremely unconcerned;
7= extremely concerned). Responses to these items formed an index (= .86), which we labeled
climate change beliefs and coded so that higher scores are associated with increased belief in and
concern regarding the fundamental science of climate change. These items collectively
encompass the key beliefs theorized by the GBM to be impacted by scientific consensus
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The full question wording for all items that comprised each outcome measure is reported in the
Supplementary Materials.
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messages about climate change (van der Linden et al., 2019, p. 50). Respondents also reported
the extent to which they disagreed or agreed with the statement, “the idea that climate change is
primarily due to human activities is a hoax or a conspiracy”, on a 7-point scale with higher
values indicating increased hoax beliefs.
Results: Study 1
To test our hypotheses, we estimate OLS regression models with robust standard errors.
For each dependent variable, we regress the outcome measure on our condition indicators,
omitting the Control condition as our reference group, using the entire sample, followed by
separate models restricted to respondents identifying as Republican, Independent, and Democrat.
We present the results in a series of figures containing the plotted point estimates, and error bars
representing the 95% confidence interval. We also include the coefficient estimate and
associated p-value as marker labels to provide additional clarity. The Supplemental Material
contains the full models corresponding to each dependent variable in a traditional table format.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Our first hypothesis was not supported by our findings. We did not find that (H1a)
conspiracy rhetoric affected on average views about the negative consequences that would result
from climate change, with or without a Trump source cue (Figure 1). Nor did we find that the
conspiracy rhetoric, with or without the Trump source cue, influenced respondents’ climate
change beliefs (Figure 2). However, there is some evidence of a conditional conspiracy theory
effect: when the conspiracy rhetoric was linked to President Trump in the absence of the
scientific evidence, Republicans had significantly lower scores for belief in climate change
(p=.02). This conditional conspiracy effect only manifested in the presence of an in-partisan
source cue and in the absence of competing information from the scientific report. In general,
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we found little impact of exposure to a conspiracy theory attacking the scientific conclusions in
the NCA4 report.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
We find only marginal support for our second prediction (H2a): respondents who had
received the scientific information in the NCA4 reported greater expected negative effects from
climate change than those in the control condition (p = .08, two-tailed test). However, the
inclusion of President Trump as a source cue (H4), did not increase its impact on Republicans. In
fact, the scientific report with no source had a greater impact among Republican respondents
relative to their counterparts in the control condition (p=.03) (Figure 1). We also predicted
reading the scientific report’s conclusions would lead to higher levels of belief in and concern
about climate change (Figure 2). There was no support for this prediction.
Perhaps surprisingly, respondents who were presented with the NCA4 report alongside
conspiracy rhetoric attacking its conclusions (H3a) had significantly higher scores for negative
effects resulting from climate change (see Figure 1). This finding held both for respondents
randomly assigned to the Conspiracy and Scientific Report condition (p=.01) and for the
Conspiracy with source cue and Scientific Report condition (p=.04). The effects of the
consensus report in competition with conspiracy rhetoric were most pronounced among
Republican respondents, who displayed the largest increase relative to their counterparts in the
control condition that climate change will have negative effects (p = .02), even in the presence of
a source cue linking President Trump with the conspiracy rhetoric attacking the NCA4’s
conclusions (p =.01). Thus, in competition, the report’s conclusions overpowered the conspiracy
rhetoric. In support of H3, the scientific report presented in competition with conspiracy rhetoric
largely resulted in no impact on respondents’ climate change beliefs (see Figure 2), except
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among Independents whose scores for the combined scientific report with the conspiracy rhetoric
and no source were higher than those of the control group (p=.04). The powerful impact of
consensus scientific information in competitive rhetorical settings and among Republicans is
particularly noteworthy and supports the GBM’s argument regarding the desirable effects that
communicating scientific consensus information can exert skeptical audiences. In our study,
scientific information from the NCA4 report is perceived as “stronger” – even among
Republicans in the presence of in-group sources promoting a conspiracy theory attacking the
science – than a conspiracy theory that climate change is a hoax.
We also tested the extent to which respondents who read the conspiracy rhetoric
associated with the report’s conclusions would be more likely to express the general belief that
climate change itself is a hoax or conspiracy. We found that the conspiracy rhetoric in isolation,
with or without a Trump source cue, had no effect on respondents’ beliefs about the degree to
which the idea of climate change was a conspiracy.4

Materials and Methods: Study 2
Study 2 was designed to focus on a technological solution to climate change: carbon
capture and storage, a process involving separating carbon dioxide from the exhaust or waste at
sources such as power plants or factories, transporting it and storing it underground (Gibbins &
Chalmers, 2008). We investigated the impact of exposure to consensus scientific information
from a 2018 report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) wherein
carbon capture technology was highlighted as a necessary complement to other activities needed
to mitigate increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (IPCC 2018). In the
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We omit the model estimates from the main text in the interest of space. The full model
estimates and associated figure for Hoax are available in the Supplemental Appendix.
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same year a consensus report from the National Academies also noted the necessity of promoting
a research initiative to advance “negative emissions technologies,” including direct air capture
and mineralization of carbon (National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2018).
The two reports both recommending carbon capture and storage are an indication that this
technology has become accepted by world scientists as a necessary tool in the arsenal used to
combat climate change. At the same time that the IPCC report was released, geoengineering
technologies addressing climate change were being greeted in some quarters with skepticism
from scientists and also from some of the very people that liberals viewed as leaders in
promoting climate change awareness and concern. For example, in a December 2018 interview
with Axios, Vice President Al Gore criticized a reliance on carbon capture technology as
“nonsense”, and comparable to believing “in the tooth fairy” (Harder, 2018).
To evaluate our hypotheses about the effects of conspiracy rhetoric associated with the
technology on support for its development, we implemented a survey experiment in which we
randomly assigned 2,745 respondents to one of six treatment conditions and a control condition.
Respondents were recruited by Qualtrics in December 2019 and included quotas for party
identification, gender, age, and region.5 As in study 1, each condition contained a headline and
content in a short news article (Table 2). Those randomly assigned to the scientific report about
carbon capture were presented with the headline, “Carbon Capture Technology May Be a Silver
Bullet to Stop Climate Change”, with a statement that “a major report produced by more than
800 experts working together” on this technology had been released, and “a growing consensus
of scientists recommends adopting these carbon removal technologies”.6 The stimuli (short
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As in study 1, the sample included quotas for party identification, gender, age, and region. We
report the full breakdown of all demographics for respondents in the Supplemental Materials.
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The complete wording of the treatments for all conditions is in the Supplemental Materials.
15

article) describes how carbon capture takes the carbon dioxide from the air at the source (such as
a power plant), turns it into a liquid that “can be safely stored, or re-used to create a low-carbon
fuel that can power airplanes and trucks”, in the process reducing greenhouse gases and slowing
climate change.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Respondents randomly assigned to the conspiracy condition were presented with the
headline, “Carbon Capture is Turning Out to Be Just Another Scam”, followed by the assertion
that “companies producing these fossil fuels such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Royal Dutch
Shell and Saudi Aramco are secretly promoting this engineering solution because they could
both turn carbon dioxide capture into a profitable business while continuing to benefit from the
sale of increasing amounts of carbon fuels such as coal and oil.” The treatment (news article)
concluded that “these climate altering strategies are unproven, poorly understood, and based on
the false hope that addressing climate change simply involves a technological ‘fix’”.
Those randomly assigned to the “competitive information” conditions saw a headline that
stated: “Debated Technology May be a Silver Bullet to Stop Climate Change”, with a statement
describing carbon capture, a description of the consensus of experts recommending this
technology, and also the criticism that this is a conspiracy by the fossil fuel companies. The
study also varied the presence of a reference to former Vice President Al Gore linked with the
scientific report, the conspiracy frame, or the competitive framing conditions which quote actual
statements from Gore: “Vice President Al Gore criticized carbon capture and storage as
“nonsense” and “an extremely improbable solution.”
Following exposure to one of the experimental treatments, respondents were asked, “Do
you oppose or support using carbon capture technologies as a way to fight climate change” (1=
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strongly oppose; 7= strongly support). Respondents were also asked if they “believe the United
States’ government should decrease or increase investments into ‘carbon capture’ technologies
as a way to slow the effects expected to occur due to climate change” (1= decrease a great deal;
7= increase a great deal). Respondents also reported the extent to which they disagreed or
agreed with the statement, “The idea that carbon capture technologies can slow or reverse the
effects of climate change is a deception promoted by carbon producing industries” (1= strongly
disagree; 7= strongly agree).
Results: Study 2
To test our hypotheses, we follow the same approach discussed in Study 1 and estimate a
series of OLS models for each dependent variable. We present the results in a series of figures
containing the plotted point estimates, confidence intervals, coefficient estimates and associated
p-values. The Supplementary Materials contains the full models corresponding to each
dependent variable in traditional table format.
As we predicted (H1b) exposure to a conspiracy frame directed toward carbon capture
significantly lowered respondents’ general support for the technology (Figure 3) and willingness
to support investments into it (Figure 4). In line with our expectation, those who read the
conspiracy rhetoric attacking carbon capture, with or without a source cue linking this
information to Vice President Gore, showed significantly less support for its development (p <
.01) and for investments into it (p < .01). Those who had read the conspiracy frame were nearly
1-point less likely to support carbon capture relative to the control condition and over threequarters of a point less likely to support investment in this technology.7

7

The substantive magnitude of the difference in beliefs can be interpreted by the beta
coefficients reported in Figure 3, which quantify differences in support for carbon capture on the
7-point response scale as a result of condition assignment. Those who read the scientific report
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Also as predicted (H2b), respondents who were exposed to positive scientific consensus
information indicated greater general support for the development of carbon capture
technologies to fight climate change (p=.01). This treatment effect was significant with or
without a source cue linking the information from the report with former Vice President Al Gore,
and for all partisan subgroups (Figure 3). We also predicted that exposure to the scientific
consensus message would result in relatively more support for investments into carbon capture
technologies as a way to fight climate change. We found this effect either in the presence or
absence of a source linking the information with Al Gore (p < .01) and for all partisan groups,
although the magnitude of the treatment effect is smaller than what is reported for general
support for carbon capture (Figure 4).
[Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 here]
In support of our prediction (H3), the competing frames about carbon capture cancelled
out the main effects of each treatment when they were presented in isolation with one exception
(see Figure 3 and Figure 4): the positive and significant effect of the scientific information with
no source in competition with the conspiracy rhetoric with no source resulted in increased
support for carbon capture (p = .02, all respondents, Figure 3). However, there are clear
differences in responses to the competitive framing conditions for both general support and
support for more investments based on partisanship. In the competitive framing conditions,
Democrats are more swayed by the conspiracy frame compared to the scientific consensus
report, showing less general support for carbon capture or investment in it. This may be a
reflection of the generally more favorable view of the fossil fuel industry and its activities by

about carbon capture linked with Gore (Sci Report Gore Source), for instance, were roughly
three-quarters of a point on a 7-point scale (b=.73, p < .001) more supportive than those in the
control condition.
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Republicans than by Democrats as reflected in a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center
(Funk & Hefferon, 2019). Similarly, for Republicans, the positive scientific information
overpowers the conspiracy rhetoric directed toward the technology, again probably a reflection
of prior attitudes of Republicans that favor upstream technological interventions as opposed to
behavioral adjustments to climate change (Goldwyn & Clabough, 2020; Palm et al., 2020).
We also asked respondents the extent to which they believed carbon capture technologies
were a deception promoted by the oil industry to increase profits (Figure 5). Respondents were
far more likely to believe that carbon capture is a deception promoted by the oil industry if they
had seen the conspiracy frame, regardless of whether or not it had a source cue (p < .01).
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Democrats who had seen the conspiracy rhetoric were far more likely than other partisan groups
to display higher scores indicating that carbon capture is a deception. The conspiracy frame had a
significant effect on Independents in the sample, but it did not differentiate treated Republicans
from the control group as to whether carbon capture is a deception. Additionally, respondents
presented with scientific information from the report with or without the Gore source cue were
less likely to believe that carbon capture technologies are a deception promoted by the oil
industry for profits (p < .01).
Discussion/Conclusion
Conspiracy rhetoric surrounding matters related to scientific issues can increase belief in
a conspiracy theory (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014b; Uscinski et al., 2016; Swami et al., 2013).
Yet only a few studies have examined the presence of a conspiracy theory effect in the domain of
environmental communication (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; van der Linden, 2014). We
extended this line of research by evaluating the impact of exposure to conspiracy rhetoric
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directed at the NCA4 focused on the effects of climate change in the US (Study 1) and at a novel
climate engineering technology (Study 2). In the case of general beliefs about the impact of
climate change on society in Study 1, issues that have been discussed for decades, neither
conspiracy rhetoric nor a linkage with a partisan source had much of an impact. In Study 2
where a relatively new and unfamiliar technology is described, information presented to
respondents had a sharper effect. This tells us something important about when conspiracy
rhetoric may be most influential and exert the most impact on audiences – that is, prior to when
people have developed a well-formed belief toward an issue. The results are rather profound in
that they cut against a popular narrative: that exposure to conspiracy rhetoric strongly influences
people across contexts.
The results from both studies also contribute to an improved understanding of potential
ways to combat climate conspiracy rhetoric that is harmful and poses a threat to humans and
societies (Douglas & Sutton, 2015). Any attempt to refute a climate conspiracy theory by
providing “scientific information” may not seem likely to be an effective strategy given the
likelihood that this would be dismissed as part of the conspiracy itself (Bolsen & Druckman,
2018b). However, in Study 1 and Study 2, we find clear and independent evidence that scientific
consensus messages can overpower and combat different forms of climate conspiracy rhetoric.
This effect was evident in Study 1 among Republicans in our sample in looking at the impact of
the scientific information from the NCA4 report pitted against conspiracy rhetoric attacking it.
We found that they become more concerned about the negative effects that will result in the US
due to future climate change in a competitive messaging context. The results from Study 2 also
show that communicating scientific consensus information about the benefits of CCS neutralizes
the conspiracy theory effect that we observed when these claims were encountered in isolation.
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Again, the most pronounced positive effect of the consensus information was observed among
Republicans. Taken together, the results lend support to the GBM’s general framework
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013; van der Linden, 2015): communicating a novel form of a consensus
scientific message about climate change can be impactful on traditionally skeptical audiences
and counteract the climate conspiracy effect.
Belief in conspiracy theories and receptivity to conspiracy rhetoric also has been linked
with political partisanship (e.g., Berinsky, 2015; Miller et al., 2016; Pasek et al., 2014; Uscinski
et al., 2016). Efforts to provide information that refutes a conspiracy are “often unsuccessful”
due to the “stickiness” of conspiratorial beliefs and partisan attachments (Uscinski et al., 2016, p.
59). Partisans are more likely to believe in a conspiracy theory, and be more accepting of
conspiracy rhetoric, when it attacks the out-party. In support of these findings, we found in
Study 1 that Republicans who were exposed to conspiracy rhetoric attributed to President Trump
attacking the NCA4 report’s conclusions reduced their belief in human-caused climate change.
We note, however, that this effect emerged in only one instance – that is, when conspiracy
rhetoric was encountered in a non-competitive messaging context and when an in-party source
cue was present. We observed similar results in Study 2: all respondents reacted as we
hypothesized to either a conspiracy message or scientific message about CCS; however, in the
competitive framing conditions, Republican respondents were the group most persuaded by the
scientific consensus information, even when the information was attributed to an out-party
leader. This accentuates a key point: broad claims about the impact of conspiracy theories or
strategies to combat them need to be tempered with a more nuanced assessment of context.
The content of the experimental treatments we employed in both studies had a more
pronounced effect than the sources to which the information was attributed. When scientific
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information and conspiracy messages deal with subjects about which the general public is less
familiar, in this case carbon capture technology, the messages have a much stronger impact than
when the subject matter is one about which the respondents may have already formed strong
opinions. This may suggest that “inoculation” about potentially misleading communication
techniques with respect to less-familiar aspects of climate change may be effective in these
circumstances and merits further examination (Compton et al, 2021; Cook et al., 2017; Maertens
et al., 2020).
Finally, the sources chosen for these studies were based on realistic news stories and
actual statements from partisan leaders surrounding the NCA4 report and CCS technologies. In
addition, the treatments were administered in a “short article” and included language that
highlighted additional considerations beyond conspiracy rhetoric that may also have played a
role in shaping respondents’ beliefs. Future work should explore how different ways of
presenting information linked to a broader range of sources may impact an audience’s receptivity
to different types of scientific information or climate conspiracy theories. The studies we
designed necessarily focused on a limited range of climate conspiracy theories and on the shortterm impact of exposure to distinct types of rhetoric at a single point in time in a specific context
where competitive scientific information was present. More work is needed to understand
whether the effects we observed generalize across populations and contexts. It also will be
important to document the persistence of any conspiracy theory effect in future studies by
including an assessment of individuals’ beliefs over time. Given the harmful and dangerous
effects that the dissemination of conspiracy theories about climate change can have on public
support for action to address this problem, a more nuanced understanding of the impact of this
rhetoric is urgent.
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Condition

Headline

Control

None (Baseline condition)

Conspiracy

Fake Science Again Serves Far-Left Agenda

(H1a; H1b)

Scientific report

New Federal Climate Assessment Report
Released

(H2a; H2b)

Conspiracy &
Scientific report

Debated Federal Climate Assessment
Report Released

(H3)

Conspiracy with
source cue

Trump Argues Fake Science Again Serves
Far-Left Agenda

(H4a)

Scientific report with
source cue

Trump Releases Federal Climate
Assessment Report

(H4a)

Conspiracy with
Debated Federal Climate Assessment
source cue & scientific Report Released
report
(President Trump referenced in the text)

Prediction/ Question

(H4a)

Table 1. Design for Study 1
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Condition

Headline

Control

None (Baseline condition)

Conspiracy

Carbon Capture Is Turning Out to Be Just
Another Scam

(H1b)

Scientific report

Carbon Capture Technology May Be A Silver
Bullet to Stop Climate Change

(H2b)

Conspiracy &
Scientific report

Debated Technology May Be A Silver Bullet
to Stop Climate Change

(H3)

Conspiracy with
source cue

Gore Argues Carbon Capture Turning Out to
Be Just Another Scam

(H4b)

Gore Argues Carbon Capture May Be A
Silver Bullet to Stop Climate Change

(H4b)

Debated Technology May Be A Silver Bullet
to Stop Climate Change
(Vice President Gore referenced in the text)

(H4b)

Scientific report
with source cue

Conspiracy with
source cue &
scientific report

Prediction/ Question

Table 2. Design for Study 2
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Fig. 1. Perceived Negative Effects of Climate Change. Dots are coefficient estimates with
error bars representing the 95% confidence interval. The "All Respondents" markers, colored in
black, are estimates from a model using the full sample. Models restricted to Republicans only,
Independents only, and Democrats only are colored in red, green, and blue, respectively. All
restricted models use co-partisans in the Control group as the reference category. All significance
estimates are from two-tailed tests. A complete table of results is available in the Appendix.
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Fig. 2. Perceived Risks of Climate Change. Dots are coefficient estimates with error bars
representing the 95% confidence interval. The "All Respondents" markers, colored in black, are
estimates from a model using the full sample. Models restricted to Republicans only,
Independents only, and Democrats only are colored in red, green, and blue, respectively. All
restricted models use co-partisans in the Control group as the reference category. All significance
estimates are from two-tailed tests. A complete table of results is available in the Appendix.
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Fig. 3. Support Carbon Capture. Dots are coefficient estimates with error bars representing the
95% confidence interval. The "All Respondents" markers, colored in black, are estimates from a
model using the full sample. Models restricted to Republicans only, Independents only, and
Democrats only are colored in red, green, and blue, respectively. All restricted models use copartisans in the Control group as the reference category. All significance estimates are from twotailed tests. A complete table of results is available in the Appendix.
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Fig. 4. Invest in Carbon Capture. Dots are coefficient estimates with error bars representing
the 95% confidence interval. The "All Respondents" markers, colored in black, are estimates
from a model using the full sample. Models restricted to Republicans only, Independents only,
and Democrats only are colored in red, green, and blue, respectively. All restricted models use
co-partisans in the Control group as the reference category. All significance estimates are from
two-tailed tests. A complete table of results is available in the Appendix.
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Fig. 5. Carbon Capture is a Deception. Dots are coefficient estimates with error bars
representing the 95% confidence interval. The "All Respondents" markers, colored in black, are
estimates from a model using the full sample. Models restricted to Republicans only,
Independents only, and Democrats only are colored in red, green, and blue, respectively. All
restricted models use co-partisans in the Control group as the reference category. All significance
estimates are from two-tailed tests. A complete table of results is available in the Appendix.
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